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NOTE
EXCESSIVE RIGHTS FOR PUTATIVE FATHERS:
HEART OF ADOPTIONS JEOPARDIZES RIGHTS OF
MOTHER AND CHILD
Michelle Kaminsky'
The Supreme Court's recognition in the 1970's and 1980's of the due
process rights of unmarried biological fathers led to the much-publicized
disruption of several adoptions.' The rights the Court recognized came
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1. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-68 (1983) (holding constitutional a
putative father registry requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate a commitment to their children to retain their rights to those children); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 391-94 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a New York law allowing an unmarried
biological mother to contest the adoption of her child but not allowing an unmarried
biological father to do the same); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (holding
that an unmarried biological father has the right to a hearing to determine his fitness as a
parent before his children can be taken from his home).
Prior to these cases, unmarried biological fathers were not afforded rights with regard
to their children. See Claire L. McKenna, Note, To Unknown Male: Notice of Plan For
Adoption in the Florida2001 Adoption Act, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 789, 795 (2004).
Historically, a child born to a married woman was deemed to be the biological child of her
husband, even if the child was conceived out of wedlock with another man. Id. at 795-96.
Unmarried women gained legal rights to their children beginning at the end of the
nineteenth century. Id. at 797.
There have been several news stories depicting children being torn from their adoptive
homes as a result of fathers asserting their parental rights. See, e.g., Mary Beck, Legal Q
& A, Birthfather Registries-Good News!, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 55,
available at http://www.adoptivefamilies.com/pdf/birthfather.pdf [hereinafter Beck,
Birthfather Registries]. For example, Baby Jessica was taken from the security of her
adoptive home to be placed with her biological father, with whom she had no prior
relationship. See In re Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241, 246 (Iowa 1992); see also
Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database,25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1031, 1036 (2002) [hereinafter Beck, Toward a National Database] ("Wrenching
publicity caught the nation's attention when the thwarted father of Baby Jessica, who was
born to an unwed mother, disrupted the adoption of a then two-year-old Jessica."); Joan
Biskupic, High Court Refuses to Intervene in Custody Case, WASH. POST, Jul. 31, 1993, at
A3.
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at a price to the mother, child, and adoptive parents.2 In many instances,
the father was either unaware of the child's paternity or of the adoption
proceeding, or both, prior to the child's placement in the adoptive home.3
In such cases, the father's subsequent claim to his child resulted in the
disruption or severing of the child's stable and loving environment. 4
Prompted by the courts, and in the interest of protecting all parties
involved, many states enacted putative father 5 registries in order to
ensure notice to fathers of adoption proceedings at an early stage and
reduce the risk of late-contested adoptions.6
The story of Baby Jessica was soon followed by similar stories, such as that of Baby
Richard. See Beck, Toward a National Database, supra, at 1036; see also Illinois Father
Granted Custody of Baby Richard, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1995, at A4 ("For the second
time, the Illinois Supreme Court has given custody of Baby Richard to his biological
father, taking the child from the adoptive parents who have raised him for his 3 years.");
Parents and Baby Richard Get Acquainted on 1st Day, WASH. POST, May 2, 1995, at A6
("'They were interacting ... I won't say they were bonding right away, but they were
interacting."' (quoting the lawyer of Otakar and Daniela Kirchner, Baby Richard's
biological parents)); Edward Walsh, Controversial Illinois Adoption Ruling Upheld,
WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1994, at A6. Further outrage regarding the Illinois court's decision
erupted when approximately two years later, the biological father of Baby Richard
"moved out of the family home." Dirk Johnson, Father Who Won Custody Case Over
Adopted Boy Moves Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1997, at A10.
2. See Biological Parents Bring Jessica Home, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1993, at A6;
Sandra G. Boodman, Uprooting Jessica: Psychiatrists Say Childhood Loss Can Have a
Lifelong Impact, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1993, (Health), at 27.
3. See Beck, BirthfatherRegistries, supra note 1, at 55; Walsh, supra note 1.
4. See Boodman, supra note 2.
5. A putative father is defined as "[t]he alleged biological father of a child born out
of wedlock." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 641 (8th ed. 2004).
6. See Beck, Toward a National Database,supra note 1, at 1036 ("Babies Richard
and Emily followed Jessica, and in their wake States began following New York's lead by
enacting putative father registries for unwed fathers in an effort to decrease contested
adoptions." (footnote omitted)); see also WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C.
O'BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 193 (2d ed. 2007) ("Major problems of notice
have arisen in cases of unknown and sometimes unmarried fathers in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois....
To address this concern, states have
generally established procedures ranging from use of certified or registered mail, to
notifying a putative father at his last known address, to special registries in which a
putative father can place his name and request that he be notified if certain conditions
occur."); Kimberly Barton, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: State Adoption Statutes and
the Unknown Biological Father,32 CAP. U. L. REV. 113, 114 (2003) ("Since the Court has
not decided whether there must be an attempt to notify an unwed father whose identity or
whereabouts is [sic] unknown of his child's pending adoption, states have had little
guidance in resolving this complex issue. States that choose to protect the unknown
father's inchoate interest in assuming a responsible role in the future of his child . ..
employ . . . putative father registries ..
" (footnote omitted)); id. at 127 ("The most
common approach taken by states to protect the inchoate parental interest of the
unknown father is the establishment of putative father registries. Putative father registries
generally allow unwed men who believe they may have fathered a child out of wedlock to
file notice with the appropriate state agency." (footnote omitted)).
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Putative father registries generally operate by guaranteeing notice of
adoption proceedings to putative fathers who file a claim with the
registry This notice provides a putative father with the opportunity to
assert his rights to his child or consent to the adoption.8 The registries
serve dual purposes. The first is to protect the fathers' parental rights by
requiring that notice of the adoption proceedings be given to those
fathers who have registered.9 The second is to protect the privacy rights
of mothers by not forcing them to identify the possible fathers of their

7. See Rebeca Aizpuru, Protecting the Unwed Father's Opportunity to Parent: A
Survey of Paternity Registry Statutes, 18 REV. LITIG. 703, 720 (1999); Beck, Toward a
National Database,supra note 1, at 1039 ("The mechanics of paternity registries require a
man who believes he may have fathered a child out of wedlock to file a notice with the
appropriate state agency.").
A majority of states have established either putative father registry statutes or paternity
acknowledgement statutes operating in virtually the same manner. See ALA. CODE § 261OC-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01 (2007); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-18-702 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
45A-716(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West 2005 & Supp.
2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-2(d)(5)
(LexisNexis 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1513 (2001); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
50/12.1 (West 1999); IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-19-5-1 to -25 (2003 & Supp. 2007); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 144.12A (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:400 (2000 & Supp. 2007);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 4A (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.33
(West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.52 (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 192.016 (West
2004 & Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-202 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43104.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:5-a(I)(c) (LexisNexis
2001); N.M. STAT. § 32A-5-20 (2006); N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 2003);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.062 (LexisNexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 75061.1 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.096 (2005); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5103 (West
2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.401 (Vernon
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.14 (2002 & Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1110 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.025 (West Supp. 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-117
(2007); see also Beck, Toward a National Database,supra note 1, at 1080-93 (providing a
chart outlining these statutes); Laurence C. Nolan, Preventing Fatherlessness Through
Adoption While Protecting the Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers: How Effective Are
Paternity Registries?, 4 WHIT-FIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 289, 308-09 (2005) ("A
typical registration statute may contain several provisions. Some provisions designate
which division of the state will establish and maintain the registry. Other provisions list
the contents of the registration form, such as, name and address of the registrant, of the
Other provisions set a time period for
child's mother, and of the child, if known ....
registration, either a period after the birth of the baby, or an open-ended period until an
adoption petition is filed, or a hybrid approach. Other provisions require that the registry
be searched when an adoption petition is filed in order to determine if the child's father
has registered." (footnotes omitted)).
8. See Beck, Toward a National Database,supra note 1, at 1039-46.
9. See Beck, BirthfatherRegistries, supra note 1, at 55.
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children. 0 In many states, the father's failure to register by a required
deadline results in the complete termination of his rights to the child."
In a recent Florida decision regarding registration requirements, Heart
of Adoptions v. J.A., an unmarried biological father filed a petition with
the court to determine the paternity of a child and to prevent an
adoption proceeding from moving forward. 2 The father had never filed
a claim with the putative father registry, even though he was made aware
of the pregnancy three months prior to the birth of the baby. 3 The
Florida Supreme Court held that before a putative father's consent can
be relinquished, the adoption agency must notify the father that he must
file a claim with the putative father registry in order to protect his
rights.14 An analysis of this case raises the issue of whether the court's
holding goes too far in protecting the putative father's due process rights
and detrimentally affects the mother's privacy rights and the child's best
interests.1 5
In the seminal case of Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court
recognized the need to use a balancing approach with regard to due
process rights.1 6 The Court stated that due process "'is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and

10. See id.
11. See Aizpuru, supra note 7, at 722. Other states allow for the attempted
notification of fathers who do not register by the required deadline. See id. Some states
provide exceptions for failing to file with the registry before the deadline. See Nolan,
supra note 7, at 311.
12. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 191-92 (Fla. 2007).
13. See id. at 194.
14. See id. at 200 ("[L]egislative intent provides that an adoption entity must serve a
known, locatable, unmarried biological father with notice of the adoption plan [which]
must advise the unmarried biological father that he has thirty days ... to file a claim of
paternity with the Florida Putative Father Registry .... "). In other words, even if a
putative father has not filed a claim with the registry, the court held that his right to
consent is not terminated unless he fails to register a claim after he has been given notice
that he must file the claim with the registry to protect his rights. Id.
15. For a discussion of the detrimental effects on children of strong protection of the
due process rights of biological parents, see Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic
Due Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1211, 1246-47
(1994).
16. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Court in Mathews held
that due process rights must be analyzed in terms of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.

2008]

Excessive Rights for Putative Fathers

circumstances.""..7 Perhaps in an attempt to properly balance the due
process rights of the father with the rights of the mother and the child,
courts and legislatures have generally found that the putative father is
responsible for having knowledge of and complying with the statutory
provisions that enable him to assert his rights to his child. 8 In response
to the argument that this unfairly favors the rights of the mother and
child to the detriment of the father, some states, including Florida, have
included in their statutory schemes provisions that require states to make
information about putative father registries and their implications
available to the public." However, in Heart of Adoptions, the Florida
Supreme Court goes even further in protecting the due process rights of
the father, and in doing so, the court jeopardizes the rights of the mother
and child. 0
This Note argues that the Florida Supreme Court exceeded what was
mandated by the Florida legislature when it concluded that section
63.062 of the Florida statutes requires that an unmarried biological father
be given notification of the requirement to file a claim with the putative
father registry before his rights to his child are relinquished. It first
examines the recognition of the parental rights of unmarried biological
fathers by the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois, Caban v. Muhammed,
and Lehr v. Robertson. This Note then examines the attempts by state
legislatures and courts to balance the rights of all parties involved by
developing putative father registries designed to protect a father's right
to notice and, at the same time, to put the onus on the father to avail
himself of this right. Next, this Note discusses the provisions of the
Florida putative father registry statutes that are applicable to the court's
17. Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
18. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983) ("The possibility that he may
have failed [to update the putative father registry] because of his ignorance of the law
cannot be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself."). The Court in Lehr also stated
that "[t]he Constitution does not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special
notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own
rights." Id. at 265; see also J.W. v. Utah, 119 P.3d 309, 315 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) ("Father
was capable of filing a voluntary declaration of paternity and preserving his rights as a
parent to Child. Thus, the trial court was not required to provide him with special
notice."); cf In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W. 2d 86, 101 (S.D. 1996) ("When a putative father
is ignorant of his parenthood due to his own fleeting relationship with the mother and her
unwillingness to later notify him of her pregnancy, the child should not be made to
suffer.").
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008). But cf Nolan,
supra note 7, at 320-21 ("Few states include publicity requirements in the registration
statute. Even those fail to implement that provision affirmatively." (footnotes omitted)).
20. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 202 (Fla. 2007). Placing the
burden on adoption agencies to inform fathers of the registry thwarts the courts'
traditional approach to place responsibility with the father to have knowledge of and to
comply with the statutory provisions. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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decision in Heart of Adoptions. Next, Part II of this Note examines the
facts of Heart of Adoptions and asserts the court exceeded what was
mandated by the Florida legislature. Part III of this Note proposes that
the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted section 63.062, resulting in an
improper balancing of due process rights in favor of the father. Finally,
this Note concludes that the court's decision to favor the rights of the
father contradicts the intent of the legislature, jeopardizing the privacy
rights of the mother and the best interests of the child.
I. PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRIES PROTECT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF
FATHER WHILE RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF MOTHER AND CHILD

The development of putative father registries resulted from the
Supreme Court's initial recognition of the due process rights of
unmarried biological fathers to their children." In an attempt to balance
the recognized rights of the putative father with the privacy rights of the
mother, many states implemented putative father registry statutes with
provisions stating that it is the responsibility of the father to have
knowledge of and protect his own rights.22 Since the implementation of
its 2001 Adoption Act, Florida has grappled with the issue of balancing
the rights of the father with those of the mother and child, as
demonstrated by the subsequent• 2003
Adoption Act, and most recently
21
the 2007 case, Heartof Adoptions.
A. The Supreme Court Recognizes the ConstitutionalRights of
UnmarriedBiological Fathers
In the early 1970's, the Supreme Court first began recognizing the
rights of unmarried biological fathers. The first such pivotal case was

21. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
22. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01 (A), (F) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054
(West 2005 & Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(a)-(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
16-1501A(3)(d)-(e) (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-12 (LexisNexis 2003); MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 259.52(8) (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-1-108(f) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.096(8) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.12(3)(d)-(e) (2002).
23. In 2001, Florida enacted the 2001 Adoption Act, Act of Apr. 16, 2001, ch. 2001-3,
2001 Fla. Laws 5, 32-33, 36-37, which was soon challenged on constitutional grounds
because it contained a requirement that mothers publish the names of the possible fathers
of their children. See G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). As
a result of this controversy, Florida implemented a putative father registry statute in its
2003 Adoption Act, providing that notice of adoption proceedings be given to unmarried
fathers who file a claim with the registry. See Act of May 30, 2003, ch. 2003-58, 2003 Fla.
Laws 455, 470, 496-98 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.054, .088 (West
2005 & Supp. 2008)). Additionally, Florida law now provides for notification to unmarried
fathers of the requirement that they file a claim with the putative father registry to protect
their rights. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
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Stanley v. Illinois. 24 There, Stanley was denied the right to raise his
children after the death of their mother because he was not married to
her, and thus, he was considered "unfit to raise [his] children" under
Illinois law. 25 The Supreme Court held that because Stanley was not
afforded a hearing to determine his fitness as a parent, and such a
hearing was available to other parents whose custody rights were
challenged, his equal protection rights were violated. 6 The Court further
evaluated Stanley's case under the Due Process Clause and held that a
similar result was mandated, stating that although the State had an
interest in protecting the children, "[t]he State's interest in caring for
[them] is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father."27 This case
was pivotal because it was the first time the Supreme Court recognized
the rights of unmarried biological fathers.2
In Caban v. Mohammed, the Court limited this recognition of the
parental rights of unmarried biological fathers to situations in which the
father has demonstrated a full commitment to raising his child.29 Abdiel
24. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
25. See id. at 646-47. The Illinois statute at issue provided that the child could be
removed from his or her home if that child had "no surviving parent or guardian." See id.
at 649 (citing ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 37/702-1, -5). The Illinois Supreme Court denied
Stanley's rights to his children based on the statute's definition of "parent." People v.
Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), rev'd 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The definition of parent
included unmarried mothers, but it did not include unmarried fathers. See Stanley, 405
U.S. at 650 (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 37/702-14). Stanley argued that the Illinois law
violated his equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Stanley,
256 N.E.2d. at 815. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected his claim, holding that the distinction
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers of "illegitimate" children in the statute had a
rational relation to the purpose of the Juvenile Act and was, thus, not a violation of his
constitutional rights. Stanley, 256 N.E.2d at 815.
26. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
27. Id. at 657-58; see also Aizpuru, supra note 7, at 709 ("In its decision, the Court
noted the importance of the integrity of the family unit as well as the custody, care, and
nurture of the child.").
28. See Aizpuru, supra note 7, at 709.
29. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) ("[I]n cases such as this, where
the father has established a substantial relationship with the child and has admitted his
paternity, a State should have no difficulty in identifying the father.... Thus, no showing
has been made that the different treatment afforded unmarried fathers and unmarried
mothers ... bears a substantial relationship to the proclaimed interest of the State in
promoting the adoption of illegitimate children." (footnotes omitted)); see also Aizpuru,
supra note 7, at 711 ("The Court held that the gender-based distinction was not justified
because Caban had proven himself a worthy father over a period of six years ....Caban
thus explicitly expanded the Stanley decision to protect men who maintain relationships
with their children, even when they do so outside of the traditional nuclear family unit
omitted)); Beck, Toward a National Database,supra note 1, at 1056 ("In
.... (footnotes
.
[Caban], the Court held that an unwed father only acquires substantial protection under
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Caban lost rights to his children when his live-in girlfriend of five years,
and the mother of his children, moved out of their home and married
another man who desired to adopt the children.3 ° Under New York law,

an unwed mother could prevent an adoption by withholding consent, but
an unwed father could only prevent the adoption by showing that it was
not "in the best interests of the child."31
The New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals
found that the statute was reasonable because of the burden that would
otherwise be placed on the State to locate and notify fathers.32 The

United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that the State's interest
was not substantially related to the distinction between the treatment of
unwed mothers and unwed fathers.33 However, the Court explained that
the Equal Protection Clause did not protect a father who had not
"participate[d] in the rearing of his child." 4 In dictum, the Court further
indicated that treating an unwed mother and unwed father differently
might be justified in the case of newborn children, due to "the special
difficulties attendant upon locating and identifying unwed fathers at
birth."33
Such difficulties in locating and identifying unwed fathers at birth led

to the development and implementation of putative father registries in
many states.36 In Lehr v. Robertson, the Supreme Court analyzed for the
first time the rights of unmarried biological fathers in the context of a

the Due Process Clause when he demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by actively rearing his child." (footnotes omitted)).
30. See Caban,441 U.S. at 381-84.
31. Id. at 385-87. In the family court, a surrogate approved the adoption, and Caban
appealed the decision, stating that the law violated his equal protection rights. Id. at 38385.
32. See id. at 384-85. The New York Court of Appeals relied on its decision in Orsini
v. Blasi. Id. (citing Orsini v. Blasi, 331 N.E.2d 486 (N.Y. 1975)). There, an unmarried
father appealed the adoption of his child who was born out of wedlock. Orsini, 331 N.E.2d
at 487. The court found that the same statute at issue in Caban was a reasonable
classification, justified by the burden that would be placed on the State to notify the
unmarried father of the adoption proceeding. See id. at 487-90 ("Great difficulty and
expense would be encountered, in many instances, in locating the putative father to
ascertain his willingness to consent. Frequently, he is unlocatable or even unknown.
Paternity is denied more often than admitted. Some birth certificates set forth the names
of the reputed fathers, others do not. Couples considering adoptions will be dissuaded out
of fear of subsequent annoyance and entanglements.").
33. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
34. Id. at 392 ("In those cases where the father never has come forward to participate
in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from
withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.").
35. Id. at 392.
36. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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putative father registry." The statute at issue provided that an unmarried
biological father is entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding if he has
filed a claim with the New York State putative father registry. 3 The
child in the case was born to unmarried parents; eight months after the
child's birth, the mother married another man who subsequently filed a
petition to adopt the child.39 After the order of adoption was entered,
Lehr contested the order because he "was not given advance notice of
However, Lehr had not filed with the
the adoption proceeding." '
41

putative father registry.
Lehr challenged the New York law, stating that it violated his due
process and equal protection rights. 42 The United States Supreme Court
held that a father's liberty interest does not warrant protection where he
has not "demonstrate[d] a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood., 43 The Court quoted Caban, explaining that the act of filing
the claim, or "'com[ing] forward,"' demonstrates that a father has made a
commitment toward fatherhood; Lehr's failure to file with the registry
demonstrated a lack of such commitment."

37. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250-51, 256 (1983).
38. Id. at 250-51 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 198283)) ("A man who files with [the putative father] registry demonstrates his intent to claim
paternity of a child born out of wedlock and is therefore entitled to receive notice of any
proceeding to adopt that child.").
39. Id. at 250.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 251.
42. See id. at 250. The New York Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the family court. See id. at 253-54. The New York Court of
Appeals held that the purpose of the notice requirement was to allow the father to give
evidence to the court regarding the best interest of the child. Id. at 254. It stated that by
not filing with the registry, the father gave no indication to the court that he was able to
provide such evidence. Id. at 254-55.
43. See id. at 261 ("[T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection."); see also id. at 262 ("If [a biological father] fails to [grasp the
opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring], the Federal Constitution will not
automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests
lie.").
44. See id. at 261, 264 (alteration in original) (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 392 (1979)). The Court found "no merit in the claim that [Lehr's] constitutional
rights were offended because the Family Court strictly complied with the notice provisions
of the statute." Id. at 265. Addressing the equal protection claim, the Court found that
one parent's lack of a personal or financial relationship with a child allows for the State to
mandate different legal rights for the two parents. See id. at 267-68 ("If one parent has an
established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned
or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State
from according the two parents different legal rights." (footnotes omitted)). The Court
distinguished the case from Caban by stating that unlike in Caban, Lehr had not
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In sum, while the Supreme Court has recognized clear constitutional
protection of an unmarried biological father's rights, it has limited that
protection to cases where the father has demonstrated a commitment to
the raising and rearing of his child.45 As indicated in Lehr, the failure on
the part of the father to file a paternity claim demonstrates - a 41lack of
commitment to his child, thus resulting in a loss of parental rights.
B. Balance Found: FathersResponsible for Complying with Provisions
That Are Intended to Protect Them

States enact putative father registries for the purpose of ensuring early
notice to a father of adoption proceedings, thus balancing his rights with
the right of the child to a stable and permanent adoption placement.47
However, issues have arisen as to whether the father's rights are
adequately protected when his failure to file a claim with the registry
resulted from a lack of knowledge of the statutory requirements or of the
existence of the child.48 In the interest of properly balancing the rights of
all parties involved, the Supreme Court held in Lehr that the
responsibility for complying with the statutory registry requirements falls
on the father.49
Since Lehr, courts have consistently held that putative father registries
sufficiently safeguard the constitutional rights of fathers." This has
"established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with [his daughter]." Id. at
267.
45. See Barton, supra note 6 at 125-26 ("Taken together, these ... cases suggest that
while a biological relationship between a father and his child will not give rise to the
father's constitutional rights, the father may establish a constitutionally protected liberty
interest by developing and maintaining a substantial relationship with his child.").
46. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261, 265; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Thurnwald v. A.E., 163 P.3d 623, 630 (Utah 2007) ("[T]he registration
statute was intended to strike a balance between two competing interests: 'the significant
state interest in speedily placing infants for adoption and the constitutionally protected
rights of putative fathers."' (quoting In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 691
(Utah 1986))); Hunter v. Doe, 751 N.E.2d 747, 752 (Ind. App. 2001) ("In the interest of
providing stability and permanence for children, Indiana provides a statutory scheme with
a specified time by which a putative father must register .... Such stringent requirements
are not punitive but are instead necessary to advance the State's policy interest of
establishing early and permanent placement of children into loving and stable homes.").
48. See, e.g., Hunter, 751 N.E.2d at 752 ("[T]he State has no obligation to assert
Hunter's rights for him where Hunter was capable of protecting his interest himself."); see
also infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
49. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
50. See, e.g., M.V.S. v. V.M.D., 776 So. 2d 142, 150 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) ("We do
not think it violates the constitutional guarantee of due process, or that it is even harsh, to
require those responsible for bringing children into the world outside of marriage to
comply with those statutes that give them the opportunity to assert parental rights."); see
also Escobedo v. Nickita, 231 S.W.3d 601, 606-08 (Ark. 2006); In re Baby Boy K., 546

20081

Excessive Rights for Putative Fathers

extended from situations where the father has no knowledge of the
requirement to register, as in Lehr, to situations in which the father has
no immediate knowledge of the fact that he has fathered a child.5 For
example, in J. W. v. State, an unmarried father appealed a juvenile court's
decision to terminate his parental rights, asserting that because he was
unsure of the child's paternity, his failure to file a paternity claim should
not have precluded him from being given notice of the adoption
proceedings.52 The court found that to secure that constitutional right,
the father had an obligation to file a claim with the registry, regardless of
whether he was sure of the child's paternity. 3 The court relied on Lehr,
within [his] control' to file a voluntary
stating that "[i]t was 'completely
54
declaration of paternity.
N.W.2d 86, 90-91 (S.D. 1996); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755-56
(Utah 1984); Robbin Pott Gonzalez, The Rights of Putative Fathers to Their Infant
Children in Contested Adoptions: Strengthening State Laws that Currently Deny Adequate
Protection, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 39, 68 (2006) ("Most state courts uphold a woman's
right to privacy and putative father registries as adequate alternative means to protect
").
putative fathers' rights to their infant children ....
51. See, e.g., Escobedo, 231 S.W.3d at 614 ("We have held, along with numerous
other courts, that the putative father's lack of knowledge is not sufficient grounds upon
which to exempt him from the statutory requirements."); J.W. v. State, 119 P.3d 309, 311,
314-15 (Utah 2005) ("Father was capable of filing a voluntary declaration of paternity and
preserving his rights as a parent to Child. Thus, the trial court was not required to provide
him with special notice."); In re C.L., 878 A.2d 207, 211 (Vt. 2005) ("Where the biological
father is not only unwed, but also for some period of time unknown, courts have not
hesitated to conclude that the father's ignorance will not excuse a belated failure to act.");
In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d at 101 ("[Father's] assertion ... that Mother should have
told him if he happened to father a child, cannot overcome the State's fully matured
interest in protecting the child's permanent home."); Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d
99, 103 (N.Y. 1992) ("Promptness is measured in terms of the baby's life not by the onset
of the father's awareness."); In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ark. 1988),
superseded by statute, ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-43-901 (1999), as recognized in R.N. v.J.M.,
61 S.W.3d 149 (Ark. 2001) (holding that notice to unmarried biological father was not
required where "[t]he biological father was not interested enough in the outcome of his
sexual encounter .. .to even inquire concerning the possibility of her pregnancy");
Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 385 N.W.2d 448, 451-52 (Neb. 1986) (holding
that a five-day post-birth limitation for filing paternity was constitutional, even though the
father claimed he was unaware of the limitation); see also Gonzalez, supra note 50, at 50
("Ignorance of the law is commonly rejected as a reason to reverse legal consequences.").
52. See J.W., 119 P.3d at 312-13 & 313 n.3, 315. The father also argued that regardless
of whether he failed to file a paternity claim, due process afforded him the right to be
notified of any proceedings regarding the child. See id. at 312-13.
53. See id. at 314 & n.5. The court explained that pursuant to Utah code, a putative
father could rescind his claim of paternity if it is later discovered that he is actually not the
biological father. Id. at 314 n.5 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45e-4 (2002)).
54. See id. at 314 (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264 (alteration in original)); id. ("His
decision not to comply with the legal steps to substantiate his paternity 'greatly
diminished' Father's 'biological parental interest' in Child because constitutional
protections attached only when 'he demonstrated[d] a timely and full commitment to the
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Many state legislatures have also addressed the issue of whether a
father's rights are adequately protected when he has no knowledge either
of the putative father registry requirements or that he has fathered a
child. Several states have statutes asserting that a father is presumptively

on notice of the possibility of a child by engaging in sexual intercourse .55
For example, under an Arizona statute, a father's lack of knowledge of
the pregnancy does not excuse his failure to file with the putative father
registry." The statute further provides that the act of having sexual
intercourse itself gives the father notice that there is a pregnancy. 7 In
Utah, a statute provides that by engaging in sexual intercourse, a father is
given notice that a pregnancy and adoption proceedings are possible, and
that he "has a duty to protect his own rights and interests."58 Florida law
is virtually identical to that of Utah.59
responsibilities of parenthood ...by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the
requirements of [Utah law]"' (alterations in original) (quoting In re Adoption of B.B.D.,
984 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1999))); see also In re Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000). In Baby Doe, a biological father appealed the Indiana trial court's decision to
grant the petition for adoption because the father did not file a claim with the state
putative father registry until six months after the petition for adoption had been filed.
Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d at 283. The father asserted that, even though he and the mother
had dated for some time, he had no knowledge of the pregnancy. Id. at 284. Further, he
stated that he had only seen the mother one time during the pregnancy, and at that time,
"she was sitting in a car." Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the
lower court, stating that "[tihe child should ...not be made to suffer when a putative
father makes no inquiry regarding the possibility of a pregnancy" and thus fails to file a
claim with the registry. Id. at 287.
55.

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01(F) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088

(West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(a)(6) (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-204(1)
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.061 (LexisNexis 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-

1505(2) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.13(1) (2002); see also Beck, Toward a
National Database,supra note 1, at 1050.
56.

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01(F).

57. Id. ("The fact that the putative father had sexual intercourse with the mother is
deemed to be notice to the putative father of the pregnancy.").
58.

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.13(1).

59. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088 ("An unmarried biological father, by virtue
of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on
notice that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur and
that he has a duty to protect his own rights and interest."), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 7830-4.13(1) ("An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a
sexual relationship with a woman: (i) is considered to be on notice that a pregnancy and an
adoption proceeding regarding the child may occur; and (ii) has a duty to protect his own
rights and interests."). Some states have provided exceptions to the registration
requirements in situations where the father has no knowledge of the existence of the child,
due to deceit or fraud on the part of the mother. See Beck, Toward a National Database,
supra note 1, at 1051. However, the courts have been reluctant to extend this exception to
situations where fathers have not investigated to whether or not a pregnancy occurred,
again emphasizing the burden on the father to assert and protect his own rights. Id. at
1063-64 (explaining that "fathers have also requested impossibility exceptions where ...
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Some states have responded to criticism that putative father registries
violate uninformed fathers' constitutional rights by enacting provisions
that require publication of information about the putative father
registries. ° These provisions ensure the father's right to notice and also
protect the privacy rights of the mother." For instance, in Montana, a
statute requires that information regarding the purpose and mechanics of
the registry be posted conspicuously in various state offices such as
district courts, department of motor vehicle offices, and local health
departments.62 In Florida, a statute requires even more expansive
It mandates that
publication regarding the putative father registries.
the Department of Health inform the public about the State's putative
father registry by promulgating an informational pamphlet detailing its
requirements. 64 The statute further requires that the pamphlet include
information regarding the procedures to acknowledge paternity and the
consequences for failing to do So. In addition, the statute provides that
"[s]uch pamphlets or publications... be made available ...

at all offices

of the Department of Health and the Department of Children and
Family Services," and that they be included in the public and charter
the mothers had misrepresented the identity of the [baby's] father to either the father or
to some third party," and noting cases where the courts denied the exception (citing In re
Adoption of Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607, 609-10 (Ark. 1992); In re A.S.B., 688 N.E.2d 1215,
1222 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997))).
60. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054(11) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) ("The Department
of Health shall produce and distribute, within existing resources, a pamphlet or
publication informing the public about the Florida Putative Father Registry .... "); GA.
CODE. ANN. § 19-11-9(d)(5) ("[T]he department shall publicize the existence and
availability of the putative father registry to the public .... "); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-514 (LexisNexis 2003) (requiring certain public offices to "post in a conspicuous place a
notice that informs the public about the purpose and operation of the registry"); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 192.106(9)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 2007) ("The department of health and senior
services shall: ... [p]roduce and distribute a pamphlet or publication informing the public
about the putative father registry... [and] [p]rovide information to the public at large by
way of general public service announcements, or other ways to deliver information to the
public about the putative father registry and its services."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2214(2) ("A notice provided by the department that informs the public about the purpose
and operation of the registry must be posted in a conspicuous place .... "); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 7506-1.1(J)(2) (West 2007) ("The department shall ... [provide] ... for the
publication and statewide distribution to the public of information as to the existence of
the paternity registry .... "); see also Beck, Toward a National Database,supra note 1, at
1049 ("Critics of registries argue that few men know of registries or the need to file to
protect their rights. Some States have enacted laws requiring greater publicizing of their
registries.").
61. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
62. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-214(2)(a).
63. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054(11).

64. Id.
65.

Id.
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66

school health curriculum.
Finally, the statute dictates that "[t]he
Department of Health [must] also provide such pamphlets . . . to
hospitals, adoption entities, libraries, medical clinics, [educational
institutions], and providers of child-related services," if such institutions
request the pamphlets." Florida's publication requirements are only a

small part of a very detailed and expansive statutory scheme surrounding
its putative father registry.6
C. The Development of the Putative FatherRegistry in Florida

Florida can trace the beginnings of its state putative father registry to
its 2001 Adoption Act. 69 Florida passed its 2001 Adoption Act on April
18, 2001, and it became effective on October 1, 2001.70 However, Florida

did not implement the registry until its 2003 revision, when the
legislature acted to comply with the Florida Supreme Court's holding in
G.P. v. State regarding the constitutionality of its publication notice
requirements.71 The 2001 Adoption Act's stated purpose was "to provide
safeguards, uniformity, and clarification regarding proceedings for

termination of parental rights and finalization proceedings in
adoptions. 72 With that purpose in mind, the legislature included a
provision in the Act that required a birth mother to provide information
to the court regarding the identity of the unmarried biological father.73 If

the father's identity and location were unknown, the statute required

66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054, .062; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.063 (West

2005).
69. Act of Apr. 16, 2001, ch. 2001-3, 2001 Fla. Laws 5.
70. Id. at 61.
71. See G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); H.R. STAFF
ANALYSIS, H.B. 835, at 1, 4 (Fla. 2003). The analysis stated that one of the purposes of
the bill was to "[d]elete[] extensive notice requirements in exchange for requiring
registration with the Putative Father Registry." Id. at 1.
72. See H.R. COMM. ON CHILD & FAMILY SEC. FINAL ANALYSIS, H.B. 141, at 1 (Fla.

2001); see also Nicholas Ciappetta, Note, Florida'sScarlet Letter Repealed: A Retrospective
Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Florida Adoption Notification Provision and a
Commentary on the Future of the Right to Privacy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 675, 676 (2003)

("The legislative intent was to promote finality in the adoption process while respecting
the parental rights of birth fathers."). The governor of Florida reiterated the Act's
purpose when he stated that the certainty of process imposed by the Act was designed "to
avoid circumstances where future challenges to the adoption disrupt the life of the child."
Letter from Jeb Bush, Governor, to The Honorable Katherine Harris, Secretary of State
(Apr. 17, 2001), reprintedin 2001 J. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 536, 552.

73. See 2001 Fla. Laws 18-19, 34.
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constructive notice of the adoption plan be given to the father.74 This was
to be achieved through the placement of an advertisement in a
newspaper in "each city in which the mother resided or traveled, in which
conception may have occurred, during the 12 months before the minor's
birth, including the county and state in which that city is located."75
According to the statute, the constructive notice had to contain a
physical description of the mother, as well as of any possible father.76
This physical description was to include the individual's "age, race, hair
and eye color, and approximate height and weight."77
In 2003, four women challenged the constructive notice statute on
constitutional grounds in G.P. v. State. The women stated that the
publication statute violated their privacy rights under the U.S.
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, as well as under article I, section
23 of the Florida Constitution.7 ' Florida's Constitution provides that
"[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life."80 The circuit court
held that the constructive notice statute was constitutional except when
applied to women who were pregnant from a sexual battery; the women
did not prove that in non-battery cases the state lacked a compelling
interest for invading their privacy. 8' However, the appellate court found
that the statute violated a woman's fundamental right to privacy, because
it "substantially interfere[d] with both a woman's independence in
choosing adoption . . . and with the right not to disclose the intimate
personal information that is required when the father is unknown., 82 The

74. See id. at 37. Governor Jeb Bush disapproved of the publication requirement,
believing it would result in the expansion of the rights of the birth father, without
requiring him to undertake any additional responsibility. See Barton, supra note 6, at 135.
75. 2001 Fla. Laws 33; Barton, supra note 6, at 134-35.
76. 2001 Fla. Laws 36-37; Barton, supra note 6, at 134.
77. See 2001 Fla. Laws 37.
78. 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
79. See id.
80. FLA. CONST. art 1, § 23.

81. G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1061.
82. Id. at 1062 ("We deem the invasion of both of these interests so patent in this
instance as to not require our analysis of cases interpreting this constitutional provision.");
see also Andrew T. Binstock, Note, Not If, But When?: Dismantling the Florida Adoption
Act of 2001, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 625, 626-27 (2004) ("A comprehensive attack on
a statute violating its constituents' privacy rights [may] not have prevailed simply on the
grounds of federal protections. However, Florida maintains a stronger and broader right
to privacy, which is explicitly stated in the Florida Constitution .

. .

. Privacy rights,

combined with Florida's general parental rights, as well as the chilling consequences of the
enforcement of the notice provision, lead to the unmistakable conclusion that the
provision was unjust and that its elimination was the only proper way to ensure protection
of Florida's privacy guarantee.").
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court then applied strict scrutiny and found that the state did not
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the intrusion of the mother's
privacy rights. 83 Thus, the constructive notice statute was found to be
unconstitutional.84
As a result of the decision in G.P., the Florida legislature almost
immediately passed the 2003 Florida Adoption Act, creating the putative
father registry as a way to ensure notice to putative fathers. 5 Although
the legislature was concerned with preserving the father's right to notice
and consent, it emphasized that "the interests of the state, the mother,
the child, and the adoptive parents outweigh the interests of an unwed
biological father who [has] not ... demonstrate[d] a relationship with his
child. 8 6 The legislature also emphasized that the father has an obligation
to protect his own legal rights, and in doing so, it recognized the privacy
rights of an unmarried mother regarding her pregnancy."
1. Preservinga Father'sRight to Notice
The Florida statute regarding its state putative father registry sets forth
the requirements for a putative father "to preserve his right to notice and
consent to an adoption. ' ..8 The statute provides that the father must "file
a notarized claim of paternity form with the Florida Putative Father
Registry in order to protect his right to notice., 89 The statute requires
that the father must include with his notarized claim a confirmation that
he desires and intends to support the child.90 The statute further states
that the father may file this claim "at any time prior to the child's birth,
but [he may not do so] after the date a petition is filed for termination of
parental rights."'"
2. When a PutativeFather'sConsent is Required
In connection to the registry requirements, section 63.062 of the
Florida Statutes lists the persons who must receive notice or from whom
consent is required in order to proceed with a termination of parental

83. G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1062-63.
84. See id. at 1063.
85. See H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 835, at 1, 6 (Fla. 2003). The Florida House Staff
Analysis stated that one of the purposes of the bill was to "[d]elete[] extensive notice
requirements in exchange for requiring registration with the Putative Father Registry." Id.
at 1.
86. Id.
87.

See id. at 1-2.

88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
89. Id. § 63.054(1).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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rights.92 The statute explicitly states that notice must be provided to or
consent must be acquired from an unmarried biological father only if "he
has acknowledged in writing, signed in the presence of a competent
witness, that he is the father of the minor, has filed such
acknowledgement ...

within the required timeframes, and has complied

with the requirements of subsection (2).93
Subsection (2)(a) requires that when the child is being placed in an
adoptive home more than six months after the child's birth, the father
must have demonstrated a commitment to the responsibility of raising
the child as well as developing "a substantial relationship with the
child." 94 Subsection (2)(b) provides the actions that must be taken by the
putative father of a child who is under six months of age in order for him
to be a person from whom consent is necessary for termination of
parental rights.9 First, the father must file a paternity claim with the
registry.96 Second, the putative father must file and execute an affidavit
asserting his desire to provide and care for the child. 97 The statute then
requires that the father pay "reasonable" expenses resulting from the
pregnancy 98and birth of the child, if the father had knowledge of the
pregnancy. Subsection 2(d) states that if an unmarried biological father
does not comply with the requirements, he is considered to have waived
his right to notice of an adoption proceeding, as well as the ability to
consent to termination of parental rights.99
92. Id. § 63.062(1).
93. Id. § 63.062(1)(b)(5).
94. Id. § 63.062(2)(a)(1) ("[A]n unmarried biological father must have developed a
substantial relationship with the child, taken some measure of responsibility for the child
and the child's future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by providing financial support to the child in accordance with the unmarried
biological father's ability, if not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized
agency having lawful custody of the child .... ). The statute also requires that the father
have visited the child on a regular basis, at least once a month or have had continued
"communication with the child or... the person or agency" caring for the child. Id. The
statute requires action on the part of the father, explaining that "[t]he mere fact that an
unmarried biological father expresses a desire to fulfill his responsibilities towards his
child which is unsupported by acts evidencing this intent does not preclude a finding by
the court that the ... father failed to comply with the requirements of this subsection." Id.
§ 63.062(2)(a)(2).
95. Id. § 63.062(2)(b).
96. Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(1).
97. Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(2).
98. Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(3).
99. Id. § 63.062(2)(d) ("An unmarried biological father who does not comply with
each of the conditions provided in this subsection is deemed to have waived and
surrendered any rights in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any judicial
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of
the child is not required.").
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3. Burden is on the Father

Section 63.053 of the Florida Statutes places the burden on the
unmarried biological father to protect his rights.'9 The statute states
that, not only is the putative father responsible for protecting his rights,
but he is also "presumed to know that his child may be adopted without
his consent unless he complies with the provisions of [the] chapter and
demonstrates a prompt and full commitment to his parental
responsibilities."' 0 ' Although the statute places the burden on the father
to protect his own rights, the legislature provided a mechanism to lessen
the burden. °2
This mechanism can be found in section 63.062, which provides that an
adoption agency may serve notice of an intended adoption plan upon a
putative father."3 Such notice can be served any time before the child is
placed with the adoptive family. l 4 The statute further states that notice
of an intended adoption plan must include notification that a father is
required to file a verified response, within 30 days of service of the
adoption plan, containing a promise to be responsible for the child if the
father wishes to contest the adoption.0 5
In addition, the statute provides that notice of the intended adoption
plan must also include notification to the putative father that he must
"file a claim of paternity form with the Office of Vital Statistics.' ' 0 6 The
notification must contain instructions for submitting such a claim.'0 7 It
was this requirement at issue in Heart of Adoptions. There, the Florida
Supreme Court held that Florida law requires the father receive
notification of the requirement to file a claim with the putative father
registry.' 0 Because the father in the case was not given such notification,
the court remanded the case to allow the father to demonstrate
compliance with the statutory provisions. '

100. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.053 (West 2005).
101. Id. § 63.053(2).
102. See id. § 63.062(3)(a).
103. Id. The statute provides that the notice may be served on "any unmarried
biological father identified by the mother or identified by a diligent search of the Florida
Putative Father Registry, or upon an entity whose consent is required." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The statute also states that when the putative father files the paternity claim,
he "must provide the adoption entity with ... the verified responses filed with the court"
and the paternity claim. Id.
107. Id.
108.

Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189,191 (Fla. 2007).

109. Id. at 201-02.
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II. HEART OFADOPTIONS MANDATES NOTICE OF
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

The court's interpretation in Heart of Adoptions of section 63.062 of
the Florida Statutes exceeds the legislative intent expressed in the 2003
Adoption Act, and in so doing, strikes an improper balance favoring the
rights of the putative father to the detriment of the mother and the child.
There, the alleged biological father learned of the existence of his baby
approximately three months before her birth.'1 ° Two weeks before the
birth of the baby, the adoption agency sent a certified letter to the father
that requested him to contact the agency regarding the mother and her
pregnancy. l" Four days before the birth of the baby, the adoption
agency sent another letter to the father stating that his failure to provide
financial support for the mother and child could be used to demonstrate
that he had abandoned the child."
The second letter provided no
notification to the father that "to preserve his right[s,] ... he must timely

file a claim of paternity with the Florida Putative Father Registry," which
the court stated was mandated by section 63.062."'
Immediately upon the birth of the baby, the father filed a petition with
the court to determine paternity and to stop the adoption proceedings."'
Heart of Adoptions, Inc., the adoption agency, subsequently filed a
petition to terminate the father's rights to the baby, stating that his
consent was not required because he failed to file a claim with the
putative father registry, and he failed to fulfill additional requirements of
the Florida Statutes."' The trial court granted the motion and terminated the parental rights of the father.1 16 The district court reversed the
judgment, stating that it did not have the authority to terminate the rights
of the putative father "because he was not a 'parent' as defined in the
statutory scheme.".... The Florida Supreme Court held that while a
putative father's rights could be terminated, an adoption entity is
required by Florida statutory law to give notification to the putative
father of the requirement to file a claim with the putative father

110. Id. at 191.
111. Id. The letter also included a disclosure statement that was required by Florida
Statute, and a request that the father sign and return the statement. Id.
112. Id. at 192. The letter also indicated that the birth mother wanted to include the
father in the adoption process. Id.
113. Id. at 192.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 193. In addition, "[t]he petition also stated that "although J.A. was able, he
refused to provide financial support after he was informed he might be the father of the
child." Id.
116. Id. at 194.
117. Id.
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registry. 8 The court interpreted section 63.062 to require an adoption
entity to serve a putative father with a notice of an intended adoption
plan, which "must advise him that he has thirty days in which to file a
claim of paternity with the Florida Putative Father Registry."11 9 The
court then remanded the case to allow the father the opportunity to
demonstrate compliance with the adoption statutes because the adoption
agency had not given him notification that he was required to file a claim
with the registry.1 20
By requiring that putative fathers be given notice of an adoption plan,
including notification of the requirement to file a claim with the putative

father registry, the Florida Supreme Court departed from the Florida
legislature's intent when it enacted the 2003 Adoption Act.121

In

addition, the court's interpretation of its putative father registry statutes
sets it apart from other states with putative father registries where the
only notice required is that of an adoption proceeding, if the father has

registered."' The Supreme Court of Florida also required that putative
fathers who have not filed a claim with the registry must receive
notification of the requirement that they file if they wish to contest the
adoption of their biological children. 123 This is a significant addition

because prior courts and the Florida legislature have indicated that the

118. Id. at 191.
119. Id. at 202.
120. Id. ("[W]e conclude that under section 63.062(3)(a), an adoption entity must
serve an unmarried biological father, who is known or identified by the mother as a
potential father and who is locatable through diligent search, with a notice of the intended
adoption plan. Pursuant to statute, that plan must advise him that he has thirty days in
which to file a claim of paternity with the Florida Putative Father Registry and to file an
affidavit of commitment in the court, which are both required in order to establish and
preserve his right to be made a party to any proceeding to terminate parental rights and to
establish that his consent is required to the proposed adoption.").
121. Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.053(2) (West 2005) ("An unmarried biological father
has the primary responsibility to protect his rights and is presumed to know that his child
may be adopted without his consent unless he complies with the provisions of this chapter
and demonstrates a prompt and full commitment to his parental responsibilities.").
122. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10C-1(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-106.01(A), (E) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-702(a)(2) (2005); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12.1(g) (West Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-5-12(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.6(1) (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 210, § 4A (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.52(1) (West 2007); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 42-2-204(2) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:6(J)(c) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(b), (h) (McKinney 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 7506-1.1(A)-(B) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.096(3) (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 160.402(a) (Vernon 2002).
123. See Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 200 ("[W]e conclude as a matter of statutory
construction that an adoption entity is required to serve notice of the adoption plan, which
contains notice of the Registry and affidavit requirements ....
").
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putative father bears the responsibility to know of
2 4 and comply with the
laws that enable him to assert his rights as a father.
1I1. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE INFRINGES ON
THE RIGHTS OF MOTHER AND CHILD

The Florida Supreme Court wrongly interpreted section 63.062 of the
Florida Statutes in Heart of Adoptions when it held that the statute
mandates that the putative father be notified of the requirement to file a
claim with the putative father registry. The court's interpretation of
section 63.062 does not comport with Florida's other statutory provisions
and express legislative intent regarding the putative father registry.' 25 By
not requiring the father to be responsible for having knowledge of and
complying with the registry provisions designed to protect his rights, the
court jeopardizes
the privacy rights of the mother and the best interests
126
of the child.
A.

Statutory Constructionis in Conflict with the Court's Interpretation

A close examination of the text of the statutes relating to the putative
father registry reveals that the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted the

intent of the legislature.

Subsection 63.062(3)(a) provides that "an

adoption entity may serve upon any unmarried biological father

. . .

a

notice of intended adoption plan at any time prior to the placement of
the child in the adoptive home."" 8 The Florida court stated that the

124. See supra notes 50, 52, 54, 59 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Mahrukh S. Hussaini, Incorporating Thwarted Putative Fathers into the
Adoption Scheme: Illinois Proposesa Solution After the "Baby Richard" Case, 1996 U. ILL.
L. REV. 189, 220-21. Hussaini notes that this responsibility is hardly a great burden for a
putative father to bear:
The burden placed on putative fathers under Illinois's new legislation is not
necessarily out of step with modern mores or the realities of contemporary
heterosexual relationships. Neither is it completely unrealistic. To meet the
burden which the new legislation places on a putative father, he need neither
remain in contact with a woman with whom he has had sexual intercourse, nor
turn to other sources of information to determine whether he has conceived a
child with her. Under the new legislation, a putative father need only file with
the putative father registry based on his knowledge that he has had intercourse
with a woman and commence a parentage action within thirty days of that filing.
His interests will not be jeopardized if he ends relations with her, and his social
habits are not, therefore, greatly affected. By simply mailing a postcard to the
registry and commencing a parentage action, tasks which can hardly be labeled a
burden, a putative father can preserve his rights to notice and consent.
Id. at 220 (footnotes omitted).
127. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
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statute could be read to mean either that the adoption entity has
discretion regarding whether or not to give notice of the adoption plan, or
that it has discretion to decide when to give the notice. 9 The court read
the above section "in pari materia" with subsection (3)(b). 30 That section
provides that if a mother identifies a possible father of her child whose
location is not known, the adoption entity must "conduct a diligent
search" to locate the father."' The court concluded that were subsection
(3)(a) interpreted
as discretionary, subsection (3)(b) would be rendered
•
132
meaningless. However, the first sentence of subsection (3)(b) provides,
as does subsection (3)(a), that upon identification by a birth mother of a
potential father, "the adoption entity may provide a notice of intended
adoption plan."'33 Therefore, the requirement to conduct a diligent
search for a father whose location is unknown only comes after a mother
has identified a potential father, or when a search of the registry by the
mother's name reveals the identity of a putative father, and an adoption
entity has subsequently decided to provide notice of an intended
adoption plan to that putative father. 34 Thus, when read in pari materia,
a discretionary option regarding whether or not to serve notice of an
intended adoption plan, which includes notification of the registry
requirements in subsection (3)(a), does not render subsection (3)(b)
meaningless, but rather demonstrates a consistent indication of
discretionary action on the part of the adoption agency.•33
In addition, subsection (2) identifies the only circumstances under
which the consent of an unmarried biological father is required prior to
129. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007).
130. Id. at 199. The court's decision to read the statute in pari materia was based on
the statutory canon of construction providing that "'courts should avoid readings that
would render part of a statute meaningless."' Id. (quoting State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817,
824 (Fla. 2002)).
131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3)(b).
132. See Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 199 ("If an adoption entity is not required
to serve the notice of adoption plan on a known, locatable, unmarried biological father,
the Legislature's mandate that the adoption entity conduct a diligent search to locate a
potential father would be meaningless.").
133. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3)(b) (emphasis added).
134. See Binstock, supra note 82, at 655 ("The only action required of the mother is
that, should she decide to place her child for adoption, she must submit a request to the
state's Office of Vital Statistics-which maintains the registry-that it search for the name
of the putative father, or his description. If the mother does not know his name, the
request may be to search for her name, in case a father might have included it in his
registration.").
135. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Adoption Notices to Genetic Fathers:No to Scarlet Letters,
Yes to Good-Faith Cooperation, 36 CUMB. L. REv. 63, 75 (2005-2006) ("Under the 2003
amendments, 'diligent' searches are only required for unwed genetic fathers who have
already affirmatively stepped up by securing a judicial declaration of paternity or by
officially claiming or acknowledging paternity." (footnotes omitted)).
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the adoption of the child. 3 6 The first statutory requirement listed is that
of registering a claim with the putative father registry.13 The second
statutory requirement provides that "[u]pon service of a notice of an
intended adoption plan or a petition for termination of parental rights
pending adoption," the unmarried biological father must file an affidavit
confirming his commitment to caring for the child.139 The use of the
word "or" indicates that providing notice of an intended adoption plan is
optional, and not exclusive. The statutory language demonstrates that
service of notice of an intended adoption plan is not necessarily required
prior to termination of parental rights.'" A reading of subsection (3)(a)
that makes notice mandatory would render the entire previous section
meaningless, and thus, would not comport with the legislative intent.
Therefore, because notice of the intended adoption plan was not
mandatory, the court should have terminated the father's rights based on
his failure to comply with the statutory provisions. 141
Moreover, subsection (2)(d) unequivocally states that if an unmarried
biological father does not fulfill the requirements of subsection (2), which
include the requirement to file the paternity form with the registry, the
father surrenders and waives his parental rights, including the right to be
given notice of an adoption proceeding.

14

The provision makes no

mention of an exception to the surrendering of parental rights if the
adoption agency fails to serve notice of an adoption plan. 143 Under
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2) ("[T]he consent of an unmarried biological father
shall be necessary only if the unmarried biological father has complied with the
requirements of this subsection." (emphasis added)).

137. Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(1).
138.
139.
140.

Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(2) (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. § 63.062(3)(a).

141. See id. In addition, subsection (2)(b)(2), provides that the affidavit confirming
the putative father's commitment to rearing the child is required "[ulpon service of a
notice of an intended adoption plan or a petition for termination of parental rights." Id.
§63.062(2)(b)(2) (emphasis added). However, in subsection (2)(b)(1), the Florida
Legislature simply states that the father must file the paternity claim with the putative
father registry; it does not state that this claim must be filed "upon service" of the
intended adoption plan. See id. § 63.062(2)(b)(1). This arguably demonstrates that the
requirement to file a claim with the putative father registry is not dependent on whether
or not notice of an intended adoption plan that includes notification of the requirement to
register has been given. See id. ("[A]n unmarried biological father must have ... [fliled a
notarized claim of paternity form with the Florida Putative Father Registry within the
Office of Vital Statistics.").
142. Id. § 63.062(2)(b), (d).
143. See id. § 63.062(2). It is made quite clear that failure to file a claim with the
registry equals relinquishment of the putative father's rights to the child. See id. §
63.062(2)(d). When discussing the advantages of the putative father registry, Professor
Beck states:
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subsection (2)(d), the court should have held that the father in Heart of
Adoptions relinquished his rights to his child because he failed to file the
claim with the registry.'"
B. Heart of Adoptions Straysfrom Legislative Intent at Expense of Child
and Mother
The court's interpretation of section 63.062 exceeds the intended
protections the Florida legislature afforded to the father and, therefore,
is detrimental to the rights of the mother and the best interest of the
child. When the Florida legislature enacted the 2003 Adoption Act, it
clearly intended to protect the constitutional rights of the putative father
only when he demonstrated a commitment to the upbringing of the
child. 14' According to the statute, this demonstration of commitment is
fulfilled only through compliance with the statutory requirements. 146
The assumption is that the man who fails to register signals the likelihood that he
will also fail to assume legal responsibility for the child .... In enacting putative
father registries, States indicate their preference for the adoptive father who
assumes legal responsibility for the child over the biological father who fails to
formally establish paternity and whose relationship to the child is a causal or
intermittent one.
Beck, Toward a NationalDatabase,supra note 1, at 1055.
144. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(d). The section does not allow for this relinquishment to be waived because the father was not made aware by Heart of Adoptions that he
must file the claim. See id.
145. See id. §§ 63.054, .062; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.022, .053(1), .088 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2008). The Florida courts maintain a strong history of examining legislative intent
to properly interpret a statute's meaning. See State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002)
("It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory
construction analysis.").
146. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(d). The legislature placed the burden on the
father to protect his own rights. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088(1); supra note 87; see also
Aizpuru, supra note 7, at 705 ("The idea behind the [putative father] registries is that the
onus of protecting the legal relationship between the father and the child should be on the
father himself."); Barton, supra note 6 at 128 ("By informing the unwed father of any
adoption petition, the notice 'gives him the opportunity to consent to the adoption, default
on the adoption petition, or argue at the initial hearing that he should parent the child
instead of the prospective adoptive parents.' By employing this process, paternity registry
laws impose the responsibility of coming forward to assert paternity entirely on the
father." (quoting Beck, Toward a NationalDatabase,supra note 1, at 1039-40)).
This is evident in section 63.088, in which the unmarried biological father is considered
to be on notice of a pregnancy and possible adoption proceeding by the mere fact that he
engaged in sexual intercourse. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088; see also Barton, supra note
6, at 132 ("A number of states have resolved these concerns by maintaining that sexual
intercourse in itself provides constructive notice of the possibility of pregnancy.");
Binstock, supra note 82, at 654-55 ("[With the implementation of the 2003 Act, t]he notice
provisions took a very different stance, protecting the father's right to care about the
consequences of his sexual activities or not. Clearly, the legislature's changes reflect not
only the legal implications of the old view, but also the public backlash against it, and the
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Further, section 63.088 explicitly states that the father "has a duty to
protect his own rights and interest[s]. ' ' 47 Such an emphatic statement by
the legislature leaves little room for the assertion that a father's duty to
protect his rights is lessened in the case where he has not received
notification of those rights from the adoption entity.' 4 The court's
holding in Heart of Adoptions shifts the burden from the father to have
knowledge of and participate in protecting his own rights, and it unduly
places the burden on the adoption agency or the mother to identify the
father and inform him of his rights.
Such a burden shift infringes on the privacy rights of the mother. In
section 63.022, the legislature makes evident that it is concerned with the
The statute provides that the
privacy rights of the birth mother."'
mother is "entitled to privacy" when making decisions regarding the
possible adoption of her child; however, the court's decision jeopardizes
this entitlement to privacy. ' The court never specifically addresses the
prevailing understanding that in order to foster parental responsibilities among such
putative fathers, they must be assigned some responsibility from the beginning").
147. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088; see also Gonzalez, supra note 50, at 48 ("The state
considers a father who takes the time to register to have taken positive action to protect
his relationship with his child and for that reason his parental rights are worthy of certain
protections. In contrast, failure to register under the requirements of a state's statute
often means the state owes no duty to the father to protect his parental interests. ... . [I]n
the majority of states with [putative father registries], an unregistered father is considered
uninterested in his child and thus, unfit as a parent.").
148. Cf Barton, supra note 6, at 131 ("[Cjourts agree that states cannot give putative
fathers an indefinite amount of time to claim an interest in their children because, at some
point, the child's interest in having a permanent and stable home must override the
putative father's interest in knowing and raising his child."). Barton also emphasizes the
rejection by courts of putative fathers' claims that failure to register in accordance with the
statutory deadlines was due to lack of knowledge of the registry. See id.
149. See supra part II; see also Heart of Adoptions, Inc v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 200, 203
(Fla. 2007). The court in Heart of Adoptions even acknowledges the legislative intent of
the statute prior to its holding, stating that "[t]he entire statutory scheme would be
frustrated . . . if an unmarried biological father could avoid having his parental rights
terminated prior to an adoption, even though he failed to comply with the requirements
. of Adoptions, 963, So. 2d at 199. However, that is exactly what occurred as
....
Heart
result of the court's decision. The court contradicted what it acknowledged to be the
intent of the statute. See id.; see also Barton, supra note 6, at 144 ("By requiring a third
party to give a putative father notice of an adoption petition, states diminish the father's
responsibility of coming forward to establish a parental interest in his child.").
150. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (discussing the intent of the legislature to
protect the mother's privacy), with Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 200 (holding that
identified putative fathers be notified of the registry requirements).
151. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022(1)(b) ("An unmarried mother faced with the
responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child is entitled to
privacy, has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and
the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding an adoptive placement.").
152. Compare id., with Heartof Adoptions, 963 So. 2d. at 200.
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procedure for service of the notice of an intended adoption plan on the
putative father. According to subsection 63.062(3)(b), if the mother
identifies a potential father, and if the father has not filed a claim with
the registry and the location of that father is thus unknown, a diligent
search will be made to locate him. 153 The statute does not mandate that
the mother identify the unmarried biological father. It simply states that
a search will occur, if she identifies him. 54 However, the court's decision
seems to mandate such a disclosure. If a putative father must be given
notification of the requirement to file a claim with the registry prior to
relinquishment of his consent and rights, the mother is forced to make
the disclosure. If she does not make the disclosure, she risks prolonging
the permanent placement of the child in an adoptive home due to the
father's ability to later contest the adoption for lack of notification. 55 It
is this type of situation the legislature sought to avoid by placing the
burden on the156father to have knowledge of and comply with the statutory
requirements.

In addition to the legislature's acknowledgement of the privacy rights
of the mother, the Florida courts also previously made the same
recognition in G.P. v. State when they struck down a statute requiring
publication of the mother's past sexual partners. 157 While it can be
argued that the "personal, intimate, and intrusive manner" in which the
privacy right was violated in G.P. distinguishes it from Heart of
Adoptions, the fundamental principal is the same: in both, the mother is
forced to make known the identity of the father of her child.5 8 Under the
holding in Heart of Adoptions, if the mother desires a stable, permanent
placement for her child, she must identify the biological father so that he
cannot later claim a right to the child because he was never given
notification of the existence and requirements of the putative father
registry." 9 It is arguable that circumstances such as rape, extramarital
153. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3)(b) (West Supp. 2008).
154. See id.
155. See Heartof Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 202-03.
156. See Letter from Jeb Bush, Governor, to the Honorable Katherine Harris,
Secretary of State, supra note 72, at 552 ("This registry imposes a duty on the birth father
to take affirmative action if he wants to later raise a parental claim. The registry, which
will be well publicized, also gives greater finality to adoptions by cutting off a birth father's
ability to later claim a child on the basis that he was unaware of the child's birth.").
157. See G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (2003) (finding that
the statutes requiring a mother to disclose "intimate personal information ... violate[s] a
fundamental right to privacy").
158. Compare id. at 1061-63 (striking a statute that required mothers to identity past
sexual partners), with Heartof Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 200 (upholding a statute requiring
adoption agencies to notify putative fathers of adoption plans).
159. See Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 202; see also Beck, Toward a National
Database,supra note 1 at 1053 ("A woman's right to keep private the identities of the man
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affairs, or incest could make revealing the identity of the father just as
personal, intimate, or intrusive as publishing the names of possible
fathers in the newspaper. By essentially forcing the mother to identify
the biological father of her child, the Florida court greatly reduces the
burden on the father to assert and have knowledge of his own rights. In
to the
doing so, the court improperly favors the rights of the father
6
0
detriment of the acknowledged privacy rights of the mother.
The possibility of fathers coming forward late in the adoption process
or even after placement in the adoptive home also puts the best interest
of the child in jeopardy. In implementing the 2003 Adoption Act, the
Florida legislature unequivocally stated that "in every adoption, the best
interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern. ' , 16' But in
Heart of Adoptions, the court failed to consider and properly balance the
best interest of the child in its efforts to extend the rights of the putative
father.
The Supreme Court, in Lehr, emphasized that in order to
protect the best interests of the child, the rights afforded to the parents
must be related to the responsibilities that they have undertaken with
regard to that child."' Therefore, the Court recognized that there is a
limit to the rights afforded to the father based on his actions and how
those actions affect the best interest of the child.' 64
Allowing a father to later contest the adoption of his biological child
due to his failure to comply with statutory provisions because of to his
ignorance of the procedural requirements could cause extensive delay in
the placement of a child in a home, or force a child to leave the only

or men with whom she has had sexual intercourse is disregarded by some judges who
coerce her to name the father. Such a requirement is faulty because it tramples the
mother's right to privacy, assumes that a mother can accurately name the father, and
induces potential fathers to rely upon the mother's accuracy or honesty." (footnotes
omitted)); Carl Belliston, Note, The Putative Father'sDue Process Rights to Notice and a
Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 BYU L. REV. 1081,1093 ("If [a mother] is required to
identify the father-or potential fathers-as a prerequisite to adoption, this may amount
to requiring the forfeiture of a constitutional right in exchange for the dubious privilege of
giving up her child.").
160. See Beck, Toward a National Database,supra note 1, at 1053 & n.88.
161. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022(2); see also id. § 63.022(1)(a) ("The state has a
compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a
prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements, and in holding
parents accountable for meeting the needs of children."); id. § 63.022(1)(c) ("Adoptive
children have the right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements.").
162. Compare Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 202, with FLA. STAT. ANN. §
63.022(2).
163. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) ("[T]he Court has emphasized the
paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents
are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.").
164. See id. at 261-62.
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home she has ever known."' Such action could detrimentally affect the
interest of the child.'
As such, the rights given to a father must be
balanced with the effect on the child. 67

In Lehr, the Court found that "[t]he legitimate state interests in
facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption
proceeding completed expeditiously

. . .

justify a ...determination to

require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural
requirements."' 6 The Florida Supreme Court's Heart of Adoptions
decision failed to consider how its statutory interpretation would allow
for a father to virtually waive the procedural requirement to file a claim
with the registry. Further, the court failed to consider the fact that such a
waiver will more than likely cause delays in adoptions, thus negatively
impacting the best interests of the child. 69 The best interests of the child
165. See Nolan, supra note 7, at 310 (explaining that when Stanley was decided, and
unmarried fathers were afforded rights to their children, the amount of children in foster
care increased because of delays in adoption proceedings, due to the attempt by the state
to locate fathers).
166. See id. at 296 ("The child's primary interest is being placed with adoptive parents
who will provide a loving, nurturing, safe, and permanent home environment. The child's
interest in a permanent environment is necessary for his or her proper development.
Placement should occur as early as possible so that the child and the adoptive parents may
bond, especially if the child is a newborn. Thus, minimum delay in the adoption process
and finality of adoption fosters the child's sense of well-being and adjustment. Removing
the child from an already established stable and permanent environment may be
detrimental to the child's development." (footnotes omitted)); see also Barton supra, note
6 at 143 ("[O]nce the child and adoptive parents have developed a stable home
environment, removal from that environment may be physically, emotionally, and
psychologically detrimental to the child's development. Therefore, awarding custody to
the putative father solely because of the biological connection may severely undermine the
child's best interests."); Nolan, supra note 7, at 314 ("Children are likely to be harmed if
they are removed from an adoptive home after they have bonded with the adoptive
family. A child's sense of timing is quite different from adults." (footnote omitted));
O'Brien, supra note 15, at 1260; Belliston, supra note 160, at 1094-95 ("Authorities agree
that stability is an unequivocal positive for any child. To that end, as soon as a child is
placed for adoption, his best interests are probably served by leaving him in the adoptive
home.").
167. See Belliston, supra note 160, at 1102 ("[T]he opportunities available to the
putative father must be appropriately limited so as to protect the other interests
involved.").
168. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265.
169. In addition, a fear of late contested adoptions can result in a decrease in
adoptions, thus placing the best interests of children at risk. See Barton, supra note 6, at
144 ("Publication requirements also have a chilling effect on adoption because some
mothers choose to have abortions rather than submit to the embarrassment of advertising
their sexual histories."); McKenna, supra note 1, at 812 ("In the first six months after the
Act's implementation, 2000 more abortions were performed in Florida than in the
previous year. The 2001 Adoption Act's opponents assert that the increase in abortions is
an inevitable consequence of the expanded notice requirement, as women will want to
avoid public exposure of their private activities. Furthermore, the law increased the

20081

Excessive Rights for Putative Fathers

clearly cannot govern if a father who has failed to comply with the
statutory requirements is later allowed to contest the adoption of a
child. 70
TV. CONCLUSION

The Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted section 63.062 of the
Florida Statutes and exceeded the mandates of the Florida legislature.
By holding that a father must be given notice of the requirement to file a
claim with the putative father registry before his rights are relinquished,
the court unduly favored the due process rights of the father to the
detriment of both the mother and child. The court failed to consider the
privacy rights of the mother and the best interest of the child, and in
doing so, the court struck an improper balance of due process rights,
resulting in negative consequences for both mother and child. The
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida statutes will result
in the disruption of the placement of children in stable and loving
adoptive homes, thus returning to the days before putative father
registries were enacted as a safeguard for rights of all parties involved.

burden on prospective adoptive parents by significantly increasing the costs of adoptions
and made adoptive parents more hesitant to adopt out of concern about the effect the
notice requirement would have on biological mothers. Consequently, the number of
adoptions in Florida decreased after the law took effect." (footnotes omitted)).
170. See Belliston, supra note 160, at 1103 (suggesting that after fifteen days it is in the
best interest of the child to prevent the putative father from making a claim, regardless of
whether he has complied with the statutory requirements, in order to "preserve[] certainty
and finality").
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